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Abstract:  
For any given order of stochastic dominance, standard concentration curves are 
decomposed into contribution curves corresponding to within-group inequalities, 
between-group inequalities, and transvariational inequalities. We prove, for all orders, 
that contribution curve dominance implies systematically welfare-improving tax 
reforms and conversely. Accordingly, we point out some undesirable fiscal reforms 
since a welfare expansion may be costly in terms of particular inequalities. 
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1 Introduction
Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) and subsequently Yitzhaki and Thirsk (1990)
demonstrated that tax reforms, for pairs of commodities or multiple com-
modities, can be welfare improving with non-intersecting concentration curves
for all additively separable social welfare functions and all increasing S-
concave social welfare functions. In 1991, they applied their technique on
the extended Gini coefficient. Accordingly, if the concentration curve of
good i dominates (lies above) that of good j, in other words, if there are less
inequalities in good i than in good j, then an increasing tax on good j com-
bined with a decreasing tax on good i enables decision makers to improve
overall welfare or equivalently to decline overall inequalities.
When the population is partitioned in many groups, a usual way to
analyze the structure of income inequalities, referring to the Gini index, is
to decompose the overall inequality (see e.g. Lerman and Yitzhaki (1991),
Dagum (1997a, 1997b) or Aaberge et al. (2005) among others) in a within-
group index GW , an average between-group index GB, and a transvariational
index GT .
1 The latter, being different from a residual, gauges between-group
inequalities issued from the groups with lower mean incomes.
In this note, we aim at using the subgroup decomposition technique
of the Gini index initiated by Lambert and Aronson (1993) in order to
show that standard welfare-improving tax reforms, for pairs of commodities
{i, j}, can be performed with less within-group inequalities, less between-
group inequalities in mean, and more transvariational inequalities in good
i than in good j. In other words, instead of looking for non-intersecting
concentration curves, we provide stronger conditions allowing for welfare-
improving tax reforms on goods {i, j} by introducing contribution curves
for all determinants of overall inequality, namely: within-group, between-
group, and transvariational contribution curves. Contrary to the results
related to traditional concentration curves (see e.g. Makdissi and Mussard
(2006)), we show that, for any order, it is sufficient but not necessary that
all contribution curves of good j lie above those of good i, except for the
transvariational contribution curve.
The note is attacked as follows. Section 2 reviews Lambert and Aronson’s
(1993) Gini decomposition. Section 3 introduces notations and definitions.
Section 4 explores welfare-improving tax reforms with the concept of contri-
1See also the Gini decompositions of Bhattacharya and Mahalanobis (1967), Rao
(1969), Pyatt (1976), Silber (1989), Lambert and Aronson (1993), Sastry and Kelkar
(1994), Deutsch and Silber (1999).
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bution curves for all order of stochastic dominance. Section 5 is devoted to
the concluding remarks.
2 Subgroup Decomposition of the Lorenz Curve
In this section, we briefly summarize the results obtained by Lambert and
Aronson (1993). Let a population Π of size n and mean income µ be parti-
tioned into K groups: Π1, . . . ,Πk, . . . ,ΠK of size nk and mean income µk.
The groups are ranked as follows: µ1 ≤ . . . ≤ µk ≤ . . . ≤ µK . Assume the
individuals are ranked within each Πk such as the richest person of Πk−1
is just positioned before the poorest one of Πk. Then, the rank of an in-
dividual belonging to Πk is given by: p(pk) =
∑k−1
i=1 ni+pknk
n
. Therefore, the
within-group Lorenz curve LW (p(pk)) is formalized to compute inequalities
within groups:
LW (p(pk)) =
∑k−1
i=1 niµi + nkµkLk(pk)
nµ
, (1)
where Lk(pk) is the Lorenz curve associated with group Πk.
2 The Lorenz
curve between groups, LB(p), is obtained by considering that each individual
within Πk earns the mean income of his group µk such as the total income∑K
k=1 nkµk is redistributed among the groups:
LB(p(pk)) =
∑k−1
i=1 niµi + nkµkpk
nµ
. (2)
The use of these different Lorenz curves yields the overall breakdown of the
Gini index (G) in three components: G = GW +GB+GT . The contribution
of the inequalities within groups (or the within-group Gini) is:
GW = 2
∫ 1
0
[LB(p)− LW (p)] dp. (3)
The contribution of the inequalities between groups in mean (or the between-
group Gini) is:
GB = 2
∫ 1
0
[p− LB(p)] dp. (4)
2To avoid confusions with further notations, we use LW (pk). In the traditional version
of Lambert and Aronson’s (1993) article, LW (·) is denoted C(·) with respect to the tra-
ditional concentration curve. Indeed, as individuals are ranked by incomes (in ascending
order within each group), C(p) measures the proportion of total income received by the
first np individuals.
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The contribution of the transvariation between groups (or the Gini of transvari-
ation) is:
GT = 2
∫ 1
0
[LW (p)− L(p)] dp, (5)
where L(p) is the Lorenz curve associated with the global population.3 The
transvariation (see Gini (1916), Dagum (1959, 1960, 1961), Deutsch and
Silber (1997), among others) brings out the intensity with which the groups
are polarized. The greater the transvariation is, or equivalently, the wider
the overlap between the distributions is, the lower the polarization may be.
3 Notations and Definitions
The Lorenz curve constitutes the basis of the preceding reasoning of de-
composition. As a consequence, for any given consumption good (say j),
we gauge the proportion of total consumption of j received by the first np
individuals ranked by ascending order of consumption. In the sequel, we use
an analogous scheme of decomposition. However, it is related to concentra-
tion curves C2(p), C2j (p) being that of good j. We analyze the proportion
of total consumption of j received by the first np individuals ranked by as-
cending order of income. In order to decompose concentration curves, we
take recourse to the same lexicographic parade introduced by Lambert and
Aronson (1993).
Definition 3.1 Let pk be the rank of a person in Πk according to her income
such as p(pk) =
∑k−1
i=1 ni+pknk
n
, and µjk the k-th group’s average consumption of
good j such as: µj1 ≤ . . . ≤ µjk ≤ . . . ≤ µjK. The between-group concentration
curve and the within-group concentration curve of the j-th commodity are
expressed as, respectively:
C2jB(p(pk)) =
∑k−1
i=1 niµ
j
i + nkµ
j
kpk
nµj
(6)
C2jW (p(pk)) =
∑k−1
i=1 niµ
j
i + nkµ
j
kC
2
jk(pk)
nµj
, (7)
with C2jk(pk) being the concentration curve of group Πk for good j.
3Note that this technique of decomposition is different from those of Dagum (1997a,
1997b), where the inequalities between groups (in mean or transvariation) involve variance
and asymmetrical effects between groups, and where GT is non negative (see also Berrebi
and Silber (1987) to learn more about the Gini index with dispersion and asymmetry).
Here, LW (p)−L(p) can be negative, then GT can also be negative (see also Lerman and
Yitzhaki (1991)).
4
The decomposition technique exhibits different concentration amounts
prevailing in a given population. These are related to the number of indi-
viduals within each group. Then, one obtains contribution indices, namely,
within-group, between-group and transvariational contributions to the over-
all concentration measure. Indeed, these ”population-based measures” ex-
plicitly involve the population shares of each Πk group (see e.g. Rao (1969)).
Consequently, these contribution indicators may then be helpful to address
issues in the design of indirect tax reforms. For this purpose, we formalize
theses contribution indices by initiating the concept of contribution curves.
Note that a similar notion, used by Duclos and Makdissi (2005), enables
contribution curves of poverty measures to be conceived.4
Definition 3.2 The within-group contribution curve (CCjW ), the between-
group contribution curve (CCjB), and the transvariational contribution curve
(CCjT ) of the j-th commodity yield a linear breakdown of the concentration
curve of good j:
CCjW (p) : = C
2
jB(p)− C2jW (p)
CCjB(p) : = p− C2jB(p)
CCjT (p) : = C
2
jW (p)− C2j (p)
=⇒ C2j (p) = p− CCjW (p)− CCjB(p)− CCjT (p). (8)
The contribution curves coincide with second-degree stochastic dominance.5
Remark that, integrating any given contribution curve provides a precise
contribution to the overall concentration index (C). For instance, CW :=
2
∫ 1
0
[CCjW (p)] dp yields the absolute contribution of the within-group con-
centration to the global amount of concentration in good j. In the same man-
ner, one obtains the absolute contribution of between-group and transvari-
ational concentrations, respectively, CB := 2
∫ 1
0
[CCjB(p)] dp and CT :=
2
∫ 1
0
[CCjT (p)] dp, such as: C = CW + CB + CT .
For the need of Section 4, s-order concentration curves are introduced.
Definition 3.3 (Makdissi and Mussard (2006)). The first-order concentra-
tion curve defined as C1m (p) = xm (p) /Xm, is the consumption of good m
for an individual at rank p divided by the average consumption of the good.
The s-concentration curve is then given by: Csm (p) =
∫ p
0
Cs−1m (u) du.
4The fact that many persons are affected by poverty or by inequality motivates the
use of contribution curve concepts for dominance purposes.
5Alternatively, one may consider, as in Aaberge (2004), that first-order dominance is
Lorenz dominance. Here, s-order dominance is related to s-concentration curves intro-
duced in Definition 3.3.
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4 Fiscal Reform Impacts
Let us define the environment on which we intend to obtain welfare-improving
tax reforms. On the one hand, we consider the following rank dependant
social welfare function (see Yaari (1987, 1988)):
W (F ) =
∫ 1
0
F−1 (p) v (p) dp (H1)
where F−1 (p) = inf
{
yE : F
(
yE
) ≥ p} is the left continuous inverse income
distribution, yE the equivalent income, F
(
yE
)
the distribution of equiva-
lent income, and v (p) ≥ 0 the frequency distortion function weighting an
individual at the p-th percentile of the distribution. On the other hand, we
impose this distortion function being continuous and s-time differentiable
almost everywhere over [0, 1]:
(−1)` v(`) (p) ≥ 0 , ` ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s}, (H2)
where v(`) (·) is the `-th derivative of the v (·) function, v(0) (·) being the
function itself. Finally, we restrict our study on the following class of social
welfare functions:
Ω˜s :=
{
W (·) ∈ {H1 ∩H2} : (−1)`v(`)(1) = 0, ` ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s}} . (H3)
Suppose the government plans a decreasing tax on good i with an increas-
ing tax on good j, letting his budget constant. This marginal tax reform
entails a variation in equivalent income F−1 (p) for an individual at rank p:
dF−1 (p) =
∂F−1 (p)
∂ti
dti +
∂F−1 (p)
∂tj
dtj. (9)
As shown by Besley and Kanbur (1988), the change in the equivalent income
induced by a marginal change in the tax rate of good i is:
∂F−1 (p)
∂ti
= −xi (p) , (10)
where xi (p) is the Marshallian demand of good i of the individual at rank p in
the income distribution. Let M be the number of goods, m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
Suppose a constant average tax revenue, dR = 0, where R =
∑M
m=1 tmXm
and where Xm is the average consumption of the m-th commodity: Xm =∫ 1
0
xm (p) dp. Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) prove that constant producer
prices induce:
dtj = −α
(
Xi
Xj
)
dti where α =
1 + 1
Xi
∑M
m=1 tm
∂Xm
∂ti
1 + 1
Xj
∑M
m=1 tm
∂Xm
∂tj
. (11)
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Wildasin (1984) interprets α as the differential efficiency cost of raising one
dollar of public funds by taxing the j-th commodity and using the proceeds
to subsidize the i-th commodity. Substituting (11) and (10) in (9) yields:
dF−1 (p) = −
[
xi (p)
Xi
− αxj (p)
Xj
]
Xidti. (12)
Following Definition 3.1, equation (12) can be rewritten as:
dF−1 (p) = − [C1i (p)− αC1j (p)]Xidti. (13)
Consequently, following H1, the variation of social welfare induced by an
indirect tax reform is:
dW (F ) = −Xidti
∫ 1
0
[
C1i (p)− αC1j (p)
]
v (p) dp. (14)
Theorem 4.1 A revenue-neutral marginal tax reform, dtj = −α
(
Xi
Xj
)
dti >
0 with α ≤ 1, implies dW (·) ≥ 0 for all W (·) ∈ Ω˜s, for any given s ∈
{2, 3, 4, . . .}, if and only if
αCCs−1jW (p)− CCs−1iW (p)
+ αCCs−1jB (p)− CCs−1iB (p) (15)
+ αCCs−1jT (p)− CCs−1iT (p) ≥ 0, for all p ∈ [0, 1] .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that the specification of within-group contribution curves brings out
the average within-group inequalities. It turns out that, it would be appeal-
ing to formalize a taxation technique ensuring decision makers that welfare-
improving tax reforms reduce inequalities within all subgroups. Indeed, this
condition is not guaranteed in Theorem 4.1, for which within-group inequal-
ities in mean may only be reduced for good j (if αCCs−1jW dominates CC
s−1
iW
for α ≤ 1). Subsequently, if we were able to construct within-group contri-
bution curves for all groups Πk, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}, (say CCs−1jW,k for the j-th
commodity) and to find a couple of goods {i, j} that guarantees dominance
between within-group contribution curves for all Πk, then we could find a
welfare-improving tax reform that decreases inequalities within each group.
This outcome culminates in the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.2 A revenue-neutral marginal tax reform, dtj = −α
(
Xi
Xj
)
dti >
0 with α ≤ 1, implies dW (·) ≥ 0 for all W (·) ∈ Ω˜s, for any given s ∈
{2, 3, 4, . . .}, if and only if
K∑
k=1
[
αCCs−1jW,k(p)− CCs−1iW,k(p)
]
+ αCCs−1jB (p)− CCs−1iB (p) (16)
+ αCCs−1jT (p)− CCs−1iT (p) ≥ 0, for all p ∈ [0, 1] .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Following Theorem 4.2, a wide range of tax programs are operational
with different constraints.
Proposition 4.3 Three particular solutions of Eq. (16) are:
S1 :=
{
αCCs−1jW,k(p) ≥ CCs−1iW,k(p) ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}, s ∈ {2, 3, 4, . . .} :
K∑
k=1
[
αCCs−1jW,k(p)− CCs−1iW,k(p)
]
≥ CCs−1jB (p)− CCs−1iB (p) + αCCs−1jT (p)− CCs−1iT (p)
}
,
S2 :=
{
αCCs−1jB (p) ≥ CCs−1iB (p), s ∈ {2, 3, 4, . . .} :
αCCs−1jB (p)− CCs−1iB (p)
≥
K∑
k=1
[
αCCs−1jW,k(p)− CCs−1iW,k(p)
]
+ αCCs−1jT (p)− CCs−1iT (p) ≥ 0
}
,
S3 :=
{
αCCs−1jT (p) ≤ CCs−1iT (p), s ∈ {2, 3, 4, . . .} :
K∑
k=1
[
αCCs−1jW,k(p)− CCs−1iW,k(p)
]
+ αCCs−1jB (p)− CCs−1iB (p)
≥ CCs−1iT (p)− αCCs−1jT (p)
}
.
Proof. It is straightforward.
(S1) This first solution postulates that all within-group contribution
curves of good j dominate those of good i, provided the former is multiplied
by α. The condition is that the dominance sum is sufficiently important
compared with the remaining terms. Then, an increasing tax on good j,
for which the repartition is favorable to rich people, coupled with a decreas-
ing tax on good i produces systematically an overall welfare improvement
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with alleviation of inequalities within each group, for any s-order stochastic
dominance.6
(S2) If the between-group contribution curve of the j-th commodity (mul-
tiplied by α) lies above that of the i-th commodity, provided Eq. (16) re-
mains positive, then an increasing tax on the j-th commodity coupled with
a decreasing tax on the i-th commodity yields necessarily an increase of wel-
fare with a between-group inequality reduction, for any s-order stochastic
dominance.
(S3) The third case is an atypical one. Indeed, welfare-improving tax
reforms might be performed with a reduction in transvariational inequalities.
Nevertheless, as depicted in Figure 1, it is not a desirable issue.
Figure 1. Inequalities of Transvariation
-
Incomes
6
Transvariation
G1 G2
Following Figure 1, when two distributions overlap, inequalities of trans-
variation are recorded. This particular concept, inspired from Gini (1916)
and subsequently developed by Dagum (1959, 1960, 1961), characterizes
the income differences between the group of lower mean income (G1) and
that of higher mean income (G2). Transvariation means that between-group
differences in incomes are of opposite sign compared with the difference in
the income average of their corresponding group. It is closely connected
with economic distances (see e.g. Dagum (1980)), stratification indices (see
e.g. Lerman and Yitzhaki (1991)) or polarization measures (see e.g. Duclos,
Esteban and Ray (2004)). Therefore, S3 suggests that welfare-improving
tax reforms can be achieved with a growing transvariation (reduction of
polarization) between the groups.
6Other constraints are available for S1. For instance, αCCs−1jB (p) − CCs−1iB (p) +
αCCs−1jT (p) − CCs−1iT (p) ≥ 0, may be viewed as a stronger variant. This remark also
holds for S2.
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Finally, decision makers can contemplate doing welfare-improving tax
reforms subject to the reduction of within-group inequalities, subject to
the decline of between-group inequalities or subject to the expansion of
transvariational inequalities. However, stronger welfare-increasing tax re-
forms may be performed in a combinatoric way: αCCs−1jW dominates CC
s−1
iW ,
αCCs−1jB dominates CC
s−1
iB , and CC
s−1
iT dominates αCC
s−1
jT .
7 This necessar-
ily implies a welfare gain with alleviation of within-group and between-group
inequalities and with transvariational expansion. The reverse being not true.
Application 4.4 A revenue-neutral marginal tax reform, dtj = −α
(
Xi
Xj
)
dti >
0 with α ≤ 1, that increases Gini social welfare functions under the domi-
nance conditions defined in S1, S2, and S3, enables decision makers to choose
between a wide range of inequality aversion parameters ν.
Proof. The class of functions WSG(·), for which v(p) = ν(1 − p)ν−1, is
the well-known family of Gini social welfare functions such as WSG(·) ∈ Ω˜s.
They are concave if 1 < ν < 2, convex if ν > 2 and consequently yield exactly
the same results as in Theorem 4.2, for any given parameter of inequality
aversion.
5 Concluding Remarks
The employ of rank dependent social welfare functions is well-suited for the
respect of ethical properties such as Pigou-Dalton transfers (Pigou (1912)),
a set {Ak} of taxation schemes (Gajdos (2002)), uniform α-spreads (Gajdos
(2004)), or the principle of positionalist transfers (see e.g. Zoli (1999) and
Aaberge (2004)). For the latter, for allW (·) ∈ Ω˜s, an income transfer from a
higher-income individual to a lower-income one (say a progressive transfer)
yields a better impact on social welfare as far as individuals’ ranks are the
lowest as possible. For instance, when s = 2, a progressive transfer occurs.
For s = 3, one gets composite transfers, that is, a progressive transfer aris-
ing at the bottom of the distribution combined with a reverse progressive
transfer at the top. Higher-order principles can be illustrated with Fishburn
and Willig’s (1984) general transfer principle, for which composite transfers
7The condition α ≤ 1 yields the set of relevant indirect taxation schemes, see Yitzhaki
and Slemrod (1991, p. 483-485). For instance, the case for which α = 1 is very useful
for applications and implies neither efficiency gain nor efficiency loss for the government,
but the indirect taxation program remains relevant, see Makdissi and Wodon (2002, p.
230-231.).
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occur both at the bottom and at the top of the distribution. Accordingly,
one should analyze, not independently, indirect tax reforms and the impli-
cation of the dominance ethical properties resulting from the social welfare
function. Therefore, if the s-concentration curve of good i dominates that of
good j, then s-order dominance and welfare-improving tax reforms may be
interpreted as direct tax programs favorable to lower-income persons coupled
with indirect tax programs, such as an increasing tax on the j-th commodity
(also favorable to lower-income earners) with a decreasing tax on the i-th
commodity, implying an overall welfare expansion.
In a more general fashion, we point out undesirable welfare-improving
tax reforms, especially when s-concentration curves are not decomposed.
Indeed, as the welfare amplification possesses three inequality counterparts
characterized by the contribution curves, it turns out that a fiscal reform
may be costly in terms of particular consumption inequalities. Accordingly,
it seems reasonable to perform welfare-increasing tax reforms in being aware
of the underlying inequality entailments: variation of the inequalities within
each group, variation of the inequalities between groups and variation of the
transvariational inequalities.
Finally, the methodology allows one to deal with Gini social welfare
functions that depend on an inequality aversion parameter. This might
contribute to shed more light on the possibility for the social planner to
adjust the power of the tax reform in function of the inequality aversion.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
(Sufficiency) Integrating successively equation (13) by parts yields:
dW (F ) = −Xidti (−1)s−1
∫ 1
0
[
Csi (p)− αCsj (p)
]
v(s−1) (p) dp. (A1)
Given that −Xidti and (−1)s−1v(s−1) are non negative, it is then sufficient
to have Csi (p) − αCsj (p) ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1] with s ∈ {1, 2, . . .} in order to
obtain dW (·) ≥ 0. Now, we have to decompose the s-order concentration
curves Cs into contribution curves CC l for all l ∈ {1, 2, . . . s − 1}, and to
use a similar dominance reasoning.
Order l = 1:
From equation (A1), an increase of overall welfare is given by C2i (p) −
αC2j (p) ≥ 0. C2i (p) is the traditional concentration curve associated with
11
good i. Indeed, remark that for any given consumption variable x, ranked
by ascending order of income,
∫ 1
0
x(p)dp is an approximation of the arith-
metic mean µ. Using the formulae of the sum of trapeze areas, we have:∫ 1
0
x(p)dp = x1p1
2
+ (x1+x2)(p2−p1)
2
+ . . .+ (1−pn−1)(xn−1+xn)
2
. Individual data en-
tail pi =
ni
n
= 1
n
. Then,
∫ 1
0
x(p)dp = x1.1/n
2
+ x1.1/n+x2.1/n
2
+. . .+ 1/n.xn−1+1/n.xn
2
= x1+x2+...+xn/2
n
∼= µ. Consequently, the proportion of x detained by the
first np individuals is: P (p) ∼= x1.1/n+x2.1/n+...+xn−1.1/nµ ∼=
∑n−1
i nixi
nµ
, where
p = n−1
n
, and where P (0) = 0 and P (1) = 1. From Definition 3.1, it is easy
to see that P (p) = C2(p) ∼= 1/µ ∫ p0 x(u)du. Now remember equation (8):
C2(p) = p−CCW (p)−CCB(p)−CCT (p) and suppose that these contribu-
tion curves are first-order curves, that is, C2(p) = p−CC1W (p)−CC1B(p)−
CC1T (p). In order to get dW ≥ 0 it is sufficient to have C2i (p) ≥ αC2j (p),
where C2i (p) and C
2
j (p) are respectively concentration curves of goods i and
j. Consequently, in order to to have dW ≥ 0, it is sufficient to match the
following condition for all α ≤ 1:
αCC1jW (p)− CC1iW (p)
+ αCC1jB (p)− CC1iB (p) (A2)
+ αCC1jT (p)− CC1iT (p) ≥ 0, for all p ∈ [0, 1] ,
where CC1jW is the first-order within-group contribution curve of good j,
CC1iW the first-order within-group contribution curve of good i, and so on.
Order l − 1:
Now assume we have:
αCC l−1jW (p)− CC l−1iW (p)
+ αCC l−1jB (p)− CC l−1iB (p) (A3)
+ αCC l−1jT (p)− CC l−1iT (p) ≥ 0, for all p ∈ [0, 1] .
Remark that concentration curves of order l + 1, C l+1(p), are equivalent to
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integrate l − 1 times first-order contribution curves:
C l+1(p) =
∫ p
0
∫ u
0
. . .
∫ z
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l−1 times
C2(t)dt . . . du
=
∫ p
0
∫ u
0
. . .
∫ z
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l−1 times
[
t− CC1W (t)− CC1B(t)− CC1T (t)
]
dt . . . du
=
∫ p
0
∫ u
0
. . .
∫ z
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l−1 times
tdt . . . du− CC l−1W (p)− CC l−1B (p)− CC l−1T (p).
(A4)
Order l:
Integrating (A4) for goods i and j leads to:
C l+2i (p) =
∫ p
0
∫ u
0
. . .
∫ z
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l times
tdt . . . du− CC liW (p)− CC liB(p)− CC liT (p)
C l+2j (p) =
∫ p
0
∫ u
0
. . .
∫ z
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l times
tdt . . . du− CC ljW (p)− CC ljB(p)− CC ljT (p).
Computing the difference between C l+2i (p) and C
l+2
j (p) provided the latter
is multiplied by α ≤ 1, it is then sufficient to match the following condition
to obtain dW ≥ 0:
αCC ljW (p)− CC liW (p)
+ αCC ljB(p)− CC liB(p) (A5)
+ αCC ljT (p)− CC liT (p) ≥ 0, for all p ∈ [0, 1] .
Equations (A2) and (A5) respect the relationship assumed in (A3). Since
(A3) implies (A5), then equation (A5) is true for all l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s− 1}.
(Necessity) In order to prove necessity, we consider the set of functions v (p),
for which the (s− 1)-th derivative (v0(p) being v (p) itself) is of the following
form:
v(s−1) (p) =

(−1)s−1 ² p ≤ p
(−1)s−1 (p+ ²− p) p < p ≤ p+ ²
0 p > p+ ²
. (A6)
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Welfare indices whose frequency distortion functions v (p) have the particular
above form for v(s−1) (p) belong to Ω˜s. Thus:
v(s) (p) =

0 p ≤ p
(−1)s p < p ≤ p+ ²
0 p > p+ ²
. (A7)
Now, imagine equation (A5) with a reverse sign and with α > 1:
αCC ljW (p)− CC liW (p)
+ αCC ljB(p)− CC liB(p) (A5’)
+ αCC ljT (p)− CC liT (p) < 0, ∀p ∈ [p, p+ ²], ∀α > 1,
with ² arbitrarily close to 0. For v (p) defined as in (A6), and decomposing
(A1) with (A5’) for all α > 1, we get a tax reform that induces a marginal
decrease of welfare: dW (·) < 0. Hence, (A5’) cannot be for all p ∈ [p, p+ ²]
and α > 1. Consequently, dW (·) ≥ 0 =⇒ (A5), whenever α ≤ 1.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.
Remember that the within-group contribution curve CCW (p(pk)) repre-
sents the contribution of the within-group inequalities to the overall inequal-
ity. The within-group concentration index CW is given by (see e.g. Dagum
(1997a, 1997b) for the Gini index case):
CW =
K∑
k=1
nkµk
nµ
.
nk
n
Ck
where Ck is the concentration index of the k-th group:
Ck =
∫ 1
0
[pk − C2k(pk)]dpk.
Then, the contribution curve of group Πk, which represents the contribution
of group Πk to the overall inequality, is:
CCW,k =
n2kµk
n2µ
[
pk − C2k(pk)
]
,
so that:
CW =
K∑
k=1
∫ 1
0
n2kµk
n2µ
[
pk − C2k(pk)
]
dpk.
14
Thus, for the order l = 1, the social welfare variation is:
dW (F ) = Xidti
∫ 1
0
{
K∑
k=1
(
αCC1jW,k(p)− CC1iW,k(p)
)
+ p− αp
+αCC1jB(p)− CC1iB(p) + αCC1jT (p)− CC1iT (p)
}
v(1) (p) dp.
Applying the same induction reasoning as in Theorem 4.1 and the same nec-
essary condition produces the desired result for any given s-order stochastic
dominance and for all α ≤ 1.
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